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From Text-Book to Book of
Authority: The Principles of
George Joseph Bell
Kenneth G C Reid☼
A. BELL’S LATER CAREER
B. PROFESSOR BELL’S DESIGN
C. THE FIRST FOUR EDITIONS
D. RELATIONSHIP TO BELL’S LECTURES
E. STRUCTURE
F. STYLE
G. SOURCES
H. INFLUENCE AND REPUTATION
Today George Joseph Bell’s Principles of the Law of Scotland is seen as marking
the end of the “institutional” period in Scottish legal development. Remarkably,
however, the Principles was originally conceived, not as an authoritative work
which would bring its author enduring fame, but as a student text intended to
replace a well-established work of the same name by John Erskine of Carnock,1
one of Bell’s predecessors in the Chair of Scots Law at Edinburgh University. And
indeed the text was seen as one part only of a whole system of legal education.
☼ Professor of Scots Law, University of Edinburgh. I am grateful to Ross Anderson, John Blackie, John
Cairns, George Gretton and Niall Whitty for help and insightful comments. An earlier version of this
paper appeared as the introduction to the 2010 reprint by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust of the
4th edition of Bell’s Principles.
1 J Erskine, The Principles of the Law of Scotland in the order of Sir George Mackenzie’s Institutions of
that Law (1754).
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This paper examines the circumstances in which the Principles was written and
considers its gradual transformation into a work of a quite different kind.
A. BELL’S LATER CAREER
On Saturday 2 March 1822 it was reported in the Caledonian Mercury that:
On Wednesday last, the Magistrates and Town Council elected George Joseph Bell,
Esq. advocate, to be Professor of the Law of Scotland in the room of the Hon. Mr
Baron Hume. By the constitution of this professorship, the election is made from a
leet of two, transmitted to the Council from the Faculty of Advocates, one of whom is
always a person whose official rank is understood to exclude him from the situation of
an actual candidate. In the present instance, Mr. Bell has been called to this important
and arduous station by the unanimous voice of his brethren; a distinction which he is
felt to have merited, not only by his well known professional talents and learning, but
by his eminent services as an institutional writer on some of the most important and
difficult branches of our municipal law.2
By the time of his appointment to the Chair of Scots Law at Edinburgh University
in 1822, Bell was already in his early 50s3 and, as the newspaper notice implies,
the author of a celebrated work, theCommentaries on the Law of Scotland and on
the Principles of Mercantile Jurisprudence, which had first appeared some twenty
years earlier and was now in its third edition.4 The Chair was a part-time position
and at first Bell continued to practise at the bar. No doubt he hoped for further
preferment, and indeed on 28 November 1827 The Times reported that Bell was
likely to “be appointed one of the Lords of Session on the resignation of Lord
Eldin, which is confidently expected”. Matters were thought so advanced that
“a very active canvass” had begun for Bell’s successor in the Chair, with J S More,5
Robert Jameson and Mungo Brown as the leading contenders. In the event, only
the first part of the story turned out to be true: Lord Eldin resigned, but the
2 As might be expected, Bell had solicited his election. A letter survives dated 9 January 1822 to an
unknown recipient (perhaps the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates) which begins as follows: “On coming
to town this afternoon, I learn that the Chair of the Professor of Scottish Law is likely to become vacant
by the appointment of Mr Hume to the Court of Exchequer. And some of my friends, thinking of me I
fear more favourably than I deserve, have urged me to put myself in nomination as a Candidate.” I am
grateful to Daniel Carr for discovering and transcribing this letter, which is held in the Library of the
University of St Andrews as part of a volume of early nineteenth century pamphlets and catalogued as
G J Bell, Application for the Chair of Scottish Law (1822).
3 Bell was born on 26 March 1770.
4 The two volumes of the first edition were published, respectively, in 1800 and 1804. In 1800 the work
was known as Treatise on the Laws of Bankruptcy in Scotland, but by 1804 (when the first volume was
reissued) the title was Commentaries on the Municipal and Mercantile Law of Scotland considered in
relation to the Subject of Bankruptcy.
5 More was to succeed to the Chair on Bell’s death in 1843.
8 the edinburgh law review Vol 15 2011
appointment went elsewhere. Nor was Bell appointed to the vacancy created by
the death of Lord Alloway a few months later.6
One reason for the failure of Bell’s candidacy may have been his support for
the separate Jury Court, which was unpopular in parts of the legal profession. Bell
had been a member of the law reform commission on court proceedings which sat
in 1823-4 and he produced a first and controversial draft of what was to become
the Court of Session Act 1825.7 His practice, already diminished following his
appointment to the Chair of Scots Law,8 came close to collapse as a result.9 As
Lord President Hope explained to Viscount Melville in a letter dated 13 March
1826:10
The poor Devil has almost entirely lost his business, which was once very respectable;
but the Body of Writers were so angry with him for his conduct in drawing up the
Judicature Bill, in principles so different from what he had himself professed, & from
what the Report of the Commission authorised, that they have withheld their business
from him to a very serious degree. On which account, as he has a large family, &
suffered severe loss by his Eccentric & vagabond brother John, the Surgeon, I would
wish that he had a permanent situation in addition to his professorship.
In the event, no “permanent position” was found for another five years. But
when the Whigs came to power following the election of 1830, the new Lord
Advocate, Francis Jeffrey – an old friend as well as a near contemporary11 –
appointed Bell as one of the principal clerks of session, a position which had also
been held by David Hume during the latter years of his tenure of the Scots Law
Chair.12 This added £1000 to the income of approximately £750 which he already
6 On 17 Feb 1829 John Fullerton replaced Lord Eldin, and on 24 June 1829 Sir James Wellwood
Moncreiff replaced Lord Alloway. See G Brunton, An Historical Account of the Senators of the College
of Justice of Scotland from its institution in 1532 (1849) xxx. Like Bell, both men were Whigs.
7 See N Phillipson, The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session 1785-1830 (Stair Society
vol 37, 1990) 152 ff.
8 GWWilton,George Joseph Bell (1929) 14. Wilton (at 9 n 4) estimates Bell’s best year to have been 1821,
immediately prior to his appointment to the Chair. See also Lord Moncreiff, “Letters and discoveries
of Sir Charles Bell”, Edinburgh Review, April 1872, 394 at 398: “His professional career as regards
practice was for many years very successful. . . But Themis is a fickle goddess, and in the jostling of the
distinguished crowd to which he belonged, in the end he was distanced by younger men.”
9 To make matters worse, his health was precarious in early 1824, due apparently to overwork. See Letters
of Sir Charles Bell selected from his correspondence with his brother George Joseph Bell (1870) 281-282
(20 Feb 1824, to George Joseph Bell): “I have vexed myself constantly of late with the idea of your
continual labour. Now, the fact is, it will not do; and you may as well give out at once that you have been
over-tasked, and broken down in harness.”
10 Quoted in Phillipson, Scottish Whigs (n 7) 157.
11 Jeffrey was three years younger, having been born on 23 Oct 1773.
12 It is sometimes said that Bell replaced Sir Walter Scott (who in 1822 had seconded Bell’s nomination
to the Chair): see e.g. D MWalker, The Scottish Jurists (1985) 338; but Scott had resigned his position
as a principal clerk of session more than a year earlier, on 12 Nov 1830, and the vacancy filled by Bell
was caused by the death of Robert Hamilton.
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received from the Chair.13 Bell’s appointment was announced in December 1831
and he first took his seat in court on 17 January 1832.14 From 1833 to 1839 Bell
also served as chairman of a particularly active royal commission for law reform.15
According to Lord Cockburn, Jeffrey “thought himself almost sufficiently
rewarded for having taken office” as Lord Advocate by being able to appoint Bell
as a principal clerk of session, adding that Jeffrey “would have made him a judge if
there had been a vacancy”.16 When, however, a vacancy did eventually materialise
the position was taken by the Lord Advocate for himself, and on the occasion of
Jeffrey’s formal installation as a judge, at 11 am on Wednesday 7 June 1834, it fell
to Bell as principal clerk to read aloud the letter of appointment from the King.17
Perhaps by then Bell had given up hope of a position on the bench. Perhaps he
had even come to accept that he could have more influence as a professor than
as a judge. That certainly had been the view of The Scotsman in noting Bell’s
appointment as a principal clerk on 28 December 1831:
The Clerkship of Session, vacant by the death of Mr Hamilton, has been bestowed
upon Mr George Joseph Bell. He at the same time retains the chair of Scots Law, and
as the two places will be nearly equal in emolument to a seat on the bench, we trust
Mr Bell’s promotion will stop here, and that he will long retain the academical situation
which he is so well qualified to fill.
As things turned out, Bell was to continue to hold both positions until his death,
at the age of 73, on 23 September 1843. Bell’s last years, however, were difficult18
and Cockburn’s tribute, written from a position of worldly success, strikes a
melancholy note:19
His death was not to be regretted, – old, blind, poor, and getting poorer, and never
forgetting the disgraceful treatment which excluded him from the Bench because he
would not be dishonest, life for him had lost most of its attractions. There could not
possibly be a better man, and he is the greatest legal writer in Scotland next to Stair.
13 As much of the income derived from student fees, the amount received depended on student numbers.
In general these seem to have fallen during Bell’s tenure of the Chair: see text at n 47.
14 Caledonian Mercury 19 Jan 1832.
15 On the workings of this commission, see W M Gordon, Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History
(Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 4, 2007) 215-230.
16 Lord Cockburn, Life of Lord Jeffrey, 2nd edn (1852) vol 1, 327. Cockburn had long been a champion of
Bell’s claim to a place on the bench. In a letter to Bell dated 10 June 1816 he wrote that: “I trust the day
is coming in which your spectacles shall scowl down upon us from the bench, and make us ashamed of
the easy felicity of our youth”: see A Bell (ed), Lord Cockburn: Selected Letters (2005) 52.
17 Aberdeen Journal 11 June 1834. See also Cockburn, Life of Jeffrey vol 1, 365. Cockburn himself was
elevated to the bench at the next vacancy, on 15 November 1834.
18 Wilton, Bell (n 8) 16-18.
19 H Cockburn, Circuit Journeys (1888) 203.
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B. PROFESSOR BELL’S DESIGN
In his inaugural lecture, which took place on 12 November 1822, Bell gave some
indication of how he intended to go about teaching the class of Scots law. While
“practical details would be rendered illustrative of principles” and “the students
would be taught to know what the law actually was, they would also be furnished
with the means of forming an opinion of what it ought to be”.20 To make time
for the more discursive approach which this statement implied, it was necessary
to provide some other means of transmitting basic information. Bell’s first idea
was to produce a synopsis of his lectures in note form but with full references –
in effect an extended lecture handout – and this was published in 1827, without
Bell’s name on the title page, as an Outline of Lectures on the Law of Scotland;
for the use of students in the University of Edinburgh. This was a substantial
work, running to some 252 printed pages.21 “It will be found to save much time”,
Bell noted in the introduction, “which may be applied to the purpose of useful
illustration”.22 Whether Bell intended all along that the Outline should only be a
stop-gap measure until a full text could be prepared is unclear. But at all events
a full text was duly published in 1829 as Principles of the Law of Scotland for
the use of students in the University of Edinburgh.23 A second edition followed
almost immediately, in 1830, and a third in 1833. There was then a gap, but on 30
October 1839 a notice in The Scotsman announced the publication, the following
day, of a fourth edition, “greatly enlarged”.24 As it was the last to be prepared by
Bell, it can fairly be treated as containing his final thoughts on the innumerable
topics covered in the Principles.
As the title makes plain, Bell’s Principles – like Erskine’s Principles before it
– was intended for students,25 and while Erskine’s work was acknowledged by
20 The Scotsman 16 Nov 1822.
21 Professor Gordon suggests that publication may have been stimulated by the questions which Bell was
asked in 1826 by members of the Royal Commission on the Universities of Scotland: see WMGordon,
“Introduction”, in G J Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 10th edn by W Guthrie (1899, reprinted
1989).
22 G J Bell, Outline of Lectures on the Law of Scotland; for the use of students in the University of
Edinburgh (1827) iii.
23 A facsimile reprint was published by Gaunt Inc in 2001.
24 A facsimile reprint was published by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust (http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/
centreforprivatelaw/studiesinscotslaw.aspx) in 2010.
25 In its attack on the recommendations of the 1831 Royal Commission, the Edinburgh Law Faculty,
while questioning the value of any “innovations .. of a purely speculative description”, boasted of
the “new means of study” provided for the Scots Law class in the form of a “Text-book, containing
minute citation of cases and authorities”: see Evidence Oral and Documentary taken and received by
The Commissioners appointed by His Majesty George IV July 23d, 1826; and re-appointed by His
Majesty William IV, October 12th, 1830; for visiting the Universities of Scotland. Volume I: University
of Edinburgh (PP 1837 vol XXXV) (henceforth Royal Commission Evidence) App 257.
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Bell as being “the standard book” for students,26 it was plain that the new book
was intended to supplant it.27 The preface to the first edition, addressed “to the
students of the law of Scotland in the University of Edinburgh”, is quite explicit:
This Introductory View of the Principles of the Law of Scotland has been prepared
for your use. I hope it will render your study of a very difficult science more easy,
by supplying you with a brief statement of the leading rules and exceptions, and a
correct list of the authorities relied on in support of the several propositions, or useful
in illustrating them.
Bell continues with an admonition which deserves to be repeated by all teachers
of law:
This book is intended not to be read merely, but to be studied. And, in doing so,
I should recommend it to you carefully to consult the Authorities to which I have
referred; to verify the propositions which they accompany; and to take note of the
practical observations, or difficulties, which arise to you in the perusal of the cases. For
you may be assured, that no man can become a lawyer by hearing the prelections or
lessons of another, without severe study; and that none ever yet became eminent in the
Law, who was not his own teacher.
To facilitate such study Bell purchased “at great cost” a private law library which
was made available to students in the mornings and again in the evenings.28
And he embarked on the arduous task of preparing summaries of every case,
English as well as Scottish, which was cited in the Principles. The result was
the Illustrations from Adjudged Cases of the Principles of the Law of Scotland,
published in three volumes between 1836 and 1838. Once again, there is an
address “to the students of the law of Scotland in the University of Edinburgh”:29
In preparing these Illustrations, I have, from a deep sense of duty to you, for whose
improvement and means of study I am bound and anxious to provide, submitted to
much irksome and unpleasant labour. But I trust that I have placed within your reach
the means of fully understanding the rules and principles of the Law of Scotland, as
best illustrated and enforced in a series of judicial determinations.
The summaries are brief, typically five or six to the page. They follow the
order of the Principles and contain a cross-reference to the relevant paragraph
of the text.30 The fourth edition of the Principles, which was published shortly
afterwards, makes sporadic reference back to the Illustrations. As well as cases,
26 Bell, Outline (n 22) iv.
27 Letters of Sir Charles Bell (n 9) 311 (3 Apr 1830, to George Joseph Bell): “I am delighted with your
substitute for little Erskine, but I am a little jealous in favour of the great book [i.e. theCommentaries].”
28 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) App 257.
29 This appears in vol 2.
30 This, of course, is to the paragraphs of the 3rd edition, but the paragraph numbers of the 4th edition
are the same except for the final part, part V.
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the text of certain key statutes is also reproduced. With the publication of both
a text-book and what amounts to a book of cases and materials, Bell had, as he
noted in the “Advertisement” to the fourth edition of the Principles, “completed
my original design”. His students were now fully equipped for the “severe study”
which law requires and demands.
If, however, Bell’s original and continuing purpose was to assist his students, he
became increasingly aware of the value of the Principles for the legal profession
and even for the courts. The result was a series of presentational changes. The
reference in the title to the students at Edinburgh University did not survive the
first edition. From the second edition onwards there was an elaborate dedication
to Francis Jeffrey – Dean of the Faculty of Advocates at the time of the second
edition (“the eminent station to which you have been raised”), Lord Advocate by
the third (“Amidst your arduous and successful exertions for the amendment of
the Representation of the People, and the establishment of a free Constitution
in our Burghs, you have not allowed yourself to neglect the less ostentatious but
not less important duty of watching over and advancing the improvements of
the Laws”), and Senator of the College of Justice at the time of the fourth (“in
testimony of his acknowledged excellence as a judge”). Finally, it was made clear
in successive prefaces that it was not only students who would find the work of
assistance. In the second and third editions, practitioners are mentioned before
students (“I was induced to undertake this Work in the hope that it might prove
useful to the profession at large, but more especially to those whose studies it
is my peculiar duty to promote”), while the fourth edition refers to the work’s
usefulness “for the sudden occasions of practice”. Nonetheless, it would no doubt
have surprised Bell that the later reputation of the Principles owed little or
nothing to its usefulness for students. This is a point to which we must return.
C. THE FIRST FOUR EDITIONS
The editions of the Principles for which Bell himself was responsible were
published in 1829, 1830, 1833 and 1839. The main changes occur between the
first and the second. Not only is the second edition considerably longer than
the first – 714 closely-printed pages compared to the 622 pages in generous
spacing and type-size of the first edition – but two completely new sections have
been added, on trusts in part III (§§ 1991-2001) and on “Rights of persons in
their public relations” in part IV (§§ 2129-2213),31 the latter covering a rather
31 In the 3rd and 4th editions this is §§ 2129-2204. The paragraph numbering in those editions is usually
identical except where changes in the organisation of the text make this impossible. The 1st edition has
fewer and much longer paragraphs, 896 in all.
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miscellaneous group of topics including citizenship, peerages, elections, poor
relief, and bodies corporate. Elsewhere, new topics are sometimes introduced,
for example the construction of contracts (§ 524). Beyond this, the main changes
are an expansion of the existing text and an increase in the number of authorities
cited. The third and fourth editions, by contrast, are largely updates of the second,
taking account of new case law32 and adding further references to secondary
literature. Some cases are also omitted as being “superfluous, or not sufficiently
striking”.33 A major change in the fourth edition is the omission from part V of the
section on actions34 on the ground that the subject has become too complicated
to be dealt with in short compass.35 In his successive revisions Bell often makes
small adjustments to wording, for example by turning a sentence round or by
substituting one word for another, but these acts of restless draftsmanship are
rarely accompanied by a change in meaning.
An example, selected more or less at random, illustrates Bell’s methods of
working. In his Outline of Lectures on the Law of Scotland of 1827 Bell gives,
in note form, the basic rules of formation of contract:36
Constitution of mutual contract. Offer. Distinction between offer and order for goods.
Acceptance of offer. Implied acceptance. Consensus in idem placitum. Limitation of
time, &c. How offer withdrawn.
A list of authorities, mainly cases, follows. In the first edition of the Principles,
the notes are replaced by two pages of text.37 The next edition gives much more
attention to acceptance: whereas the first edition had been content to explain
that an acceptance is either express or tacit, and then pass on to another topic,
the second edition proceeds to treat each type of acceptance in turn and to
give examples.38 The third edition follows the second,39 but in the fourth the
treatment of orders in trade is separated from that of tacit acceptance,40 a new
32 Compare, for example, § 534, on restitution. In the 2nd edition Bell offers the confident view that “if
the payment have been made in error, restitution may be demanded, whether that error be in matter of
fact, or even in law”. In the 3rd (and 4th) edition, however, Bell acknowledges that the view that there is
recovery for error of law “is much shaken” byWilson v McLellan (1830) 4 W & S 398. It was to remain
in that state untilMorgan Guaranty Co of New York v Lothian Regional Council 1995 SC 151 returned
the law to what Bell originally said it was.
33 Preface to the 3rd edition.
34 §§ 2205-2275 and 2330-2352 of the 3rd edition.
35 See the introductory note to part V in the 4th edition.
36 Bell, Outline (n 22) § 39.
37 § 39.
38 §§ 74-81.
39 §§ 72-83.
40 §§ 80-82.
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paragraph is added on the form of offers,41 and there is a notable increase in
the number of authorities cited. In each of the first three editions, the following
passage appears:42
Acceptance must precisely meet the offer. If it differ from the offer, the new condition
is equivalent to a new offer, which requires acceptance.
In the fourth edition this becomes:43
Express acceptance must precisely meet the offer. If it substantially differ from the
offer, the alteration is equivalent to a new offer, which requires acceptance.
The differences are interesting. In the first sentence Bell adds the word “express”
as a signal that he has now moved on from discussing tacit acceptance (which
was the subject of the previous paragraph). In the second, as well as making a
characteristic change in the wording (“alteration” for “new condition”), he now
says that an acceptance is a counter-offer only if it differs “substantially” from
the original offer. Most interesting of all is the use of authorities. In the earlier
editions no authorities were cited at all, but in the fourth edition Bell refers to
Justinian’s Institutes, Toullier’s Le droit civil français suivant l’ordre du Code
Napoléon, and to two cases from England decided in the late 1820s.
While, however, changes of the kind just illustrated are common, many other
passages survive unaltered from the first edition to the fourth; and even where the
text is adjusted or expanded there is usually little real difference between Bell’s
first thoughts and his last. What is most striking about successive editions of the
Principles is continuity, not change.
D. RELATIONSHIP TO BELL’S LECTURES
The class of Scots law met daily throughout the winter months between the hours
of 3 and 4 pm – a time designed to accommodate the professional lives both of
the professor and of those of his students who were in practice.44 The course
started at the end of October or beginning of November and lasted until early
41 § 74.
42 1st edition § 39; 2nd edition § 81; 3rd edition § 81.
43 § 77.
44 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) App 257. The venue was room 12, Old College, which, according
to a report by Playfair, had a capacity of 318: see App 164. The location of this room is uncertain. When
the northern side of Old College was built in the early 1820s, the plan was for Scots Law and Moral
Philosophy to share the room directly above modern-day room 175: see A G Fraser, The Building of Old
College: Adam, Playfair and the University of Edinburgh (1989) 230-231 and 374-375. But by the time
Playfair reported to the Commissioners, in 1827, Scots Law was sharing accommodation with Practice
of Physic, and Moral Philosophy with Conveyancing and Clinical Surgery.
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April, with around 100 lectures being given altogether.45 Students ranged in age
from 16 to 25.46 In Bell’s first year, 1822-23, there were 257 students but numbers
fell off thereafter so that in 1829-30 – the last year for which published figures
are available – only 128 students were in attendance.47
In oral evidence given to the Royal Commission on the Universities of Scotland
in 1826, Bell described his students in this way:48
The class which I teach is a very peculiar one; it consists not only of young men,
properly academical students, who are intended for the learned professions here in
Edinburgh, but of men who, without intending to submit to academical discipline,
come up from the country (some of them even considerably advanced in practice),
and who attend for the information which they may expect to obtain from the lectures.
They therefore do not consider themselves under academical control in the same way
as, in the initiatory classes, the young men are; but they attend for their own advantage
when they can, or when they find advantage in it; or neglect to attend when they find
it inconvenient, or useless.
Some – typically around 35 – would have taken the class of Civil law in the
previous year,49 but Bell considered that at least “[w]ith regard to those who are
destined for practising in the country, I think their time would be much thrown
away in such attendance”.50
Although he did not read his lectures, Bell spoke from “full notes”51 – a source
of anxiety in the near-blindness of his final years.52 No manuscript, however,
seems to have survived – as survived, and has been published, in respect of his
immediate predecessor in the Edinburgh Chair (David Hume) and also of his
immediate successor (John Schank More).53 Further, whereas numerous sets of
student notes are available in the case of Hume’s lectures, including two volumes
45 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) 188, App 123.
46 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) 186.
47 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) App 131. This anticipated a general decline in student numbers at
Edinburgh University in the 1830s and 1840s: see e.g. Journal of Henry Cockburn being a continuation
of the Memorials of his Time 1831-1854 vol II (1874) 51-53. John Cairns has suggested to me that the
class of Conveyancing, which was started in 1825-26, may have offered sufficient (and more relevant)
legal instruction for some who would previously have attended lectures in Scots Law.
48 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) 187.
49 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) App 131.
50 Royal Commission Evidence (n 24) 190.
51 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) 188. This is from the oral evidence by Bell himself, given to the
Commissioners on 18 Oct 1826. Bell added: “I am induced to do that from the great extent of the
subject, and from the peculiar views which I entertain of the way in which that class ought to be
taught.”
52 Letters of Sir Charles Bell (n 9) 395 (18 Sept 1841, to John Richardson).
53 G C H Paton (ed), Baron David Hume’s Lectures 1786-1822 (Stair Society vols 5, 13, 15, 17-19, 1939-
1958); J McLaren (ed), Lectures on the Law of Scotland by John Schank More LLD (2 vols, 1864).
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of notes taken by Bell himself in 1788-89,54 notes by Bell’s students are a great
deal rarer.55 Although doubtless there are others, I have been able to trace only
two sets: one from 1825-26 by Thomas Lees and a second from 1836-37 by John
Yule of Broughton Hall.56 They are quite different in character. Lees’ notes,
taken very early in Bell’s tenure of the Chair and before the publication even
of the Outline of Lectures, run to 433 pages plus an index and give an extensive
and detailed account of the law. Yule, by contrast, manages only 111 pages for
100 lectures57 and is sometimes extremely terse. For example, for lecture 66,
on servitudes, he records only that “Servitudes are constituted either by grant
or prescription; and they may be extinguished in several ways as confusione, or
express renunciation and discharge” – a poor return for an hour’s listening.58
Whether Yule was a typical student is of course hard to say. Nonetheless, by
examining his notes it is possible to gain some idea of Bell’s lecturing style and
of the relationship between the lectures and the Principles. In his evidence to
the Royal Commission, Bell had complained that “one course is a great deal too
long both for the spirit and strength of the Professor, and for the attention of
his pupils”, and advocated the introduction of a second course on Scots law59
– a suggestion ultimately recommended by the Royal Commission60 but then
emphatically rejected by Bell’s own colleagues.61 As it was, in seeking to cover
all of private law in just 100 lectures, Bell could give no more than a “hasty
view”62 even of those topics selected for inclusion. Yule divides his material by
lecture rather than by subject matter, making it possible to see how much time
Bell devoted to each topic. In 1836-7 Bell gave a relatively full treatment of the
law of contract, with which he began his lectures, but by later on in the course
the coverage was more rushed or even cursory. Marriage was disposed of in four
54 These are held in Edinburgh University Library (shelfmark Dc.5.37-38) and are marked as volumes 2
and 4; the other volumes are missing. Edinburgh University Library holds 8 further sets of students’
notes, ranging from 1790-91 to 1820-21.
55 One reason for this is probably that, with the publication of the Principles, the lectures themselves
became of less value.
56 T Lees, Notes on the Law of Scotland from Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh, by
George Joseph Bell Esquire Advocate; J Yule, Notes of Professor Bell’s Lectures on Scotch Law. The
former is held by the writer, the latter is in Edinburgh University Library (shelf mark Dk.2.4).
57 Though he missed two of these, including the very first.
58 Yule, Notes (n 56) 83-84.
59 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) 188. Baron Hume held the same view: see App 284-285.
60 Report made to His Majesty by a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the state of the Universities of
Scotland (PP 1831 vol XII) 53-54: “In the progress of society, the subject of the Municipal Law
of Scotland has now become so extensive, that after due investigation, we are satisfied that, even
with the important aid of the Class of Conveyancing, the whole branches of it cannot be effectually
comprehended in one Course of Lectures during a Session of six months”. See also 140.
61 Royal Commission Evidence (n 25) App 258.
62 Yule, Notes (n 56) 70.
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lectures, leases in one, and some topics which feature in the Principles were
omitted altogether, for instance prescription or common interest. Yule’s notes on a
single lecture rarely extend beyond three pages and are often much shorter, and
whereas Lees a decade earlier had given extensive lists of authority, Yule cites
virtually none. Here the effect of the Principles is obvious: if the law had already
been set out and vouched for in the lecturer’s own book, there was little point in
repeating the information in the form of notes.
For Bell, the book was an opportunity to give lectures in a more discursive
manner. Predictably, the result met with opposition. One student, Thomas Fraser,
who attended the class in 1831-32,63 later recorded in his diary that:64
[T]he lectures of Mr Bell notwithstanding his high legal reputation were generally
considered profitless, and his class were most inattentive. . . The subject of Mr Bell’s
lectures was a very wide one embracing the whole law of Scotland, with the exception
of conveyancing which he left to Napier,65 and criminal law, which he rarely touched
on, and his mode of treating it was extremely desultory consisting almost entirely of
verbal commentaries with little attempt at system or arrangement upon his own very
excellent text book.
Some at least of these “verbal commentaries” were included by Yule in his notes.
At times their purpose may have been to capture the attention of a youthful
audience by means of a striking illustration. For instance, Bell explains in the
context of force and fear that: “Once in ancient times an abbot was put into
an iron cage and roasted at a fire till he signed a charter, which of course was
found to be null.”66 More typical are the illustrations used in the lecture on error
in contract law to expand on the brief (but, as it turned out, highly influential)
treatment found in the Principles.67 These resemble, but are different from, the
illustrations which appear in theCommentaries.68 Error as to quality, for example,
is explained with a characteristic reference to French law:69
[S]uppose I order from a Brewer some ale telling him that it was wanted for exportation
to the West Indies; it spoils on the way out, and the brewer is liable, because he did not
63 This was a year or two before the lectures were attended by the future Lord President Inglis: see
J Crabb Watt, John Inglis, Lord Justice-General of Scotland: A Memoir (1893) 42.
64 Quoted in T St J N Bates, “Mr McConnachie’s Notes and Mr Fraser’s Confessional” 1980 JR 166 at
176.
65 Macvey Napier (1776-1847), although much better known as editor of the Edinburgh Review and
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, was also the first Professor of Conveyancing at Edinburgh University,
holding the chair from 1825 until his death in 1847. Thomas Fraser held Napier’s lectures in high
regard.
66 Yule, Notes (n 56) 6.
67 Prin § 11.
68 Commentaries (7th edn, by J McLaren, 1870) vol I, 313-314.
69 Yule, Notes (n 56) 4. For Bell’s use of French law, see G below.
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give the proper quality for exportation. There is a French case which bears upon this
point. A gentleman made a bargain with a Jeweller for a “watch for a lady”; the Jeweller
sent a silver watch which the gentleman refused, alleging that a lady’s watch evidently
means a gold one; and the court found the gentleman entitled to have a gold watch.
Elsewhere in his lectures, Bell’s account of the distinction between real and
personal rights is carefully set in a commercial context:70
Another division has been made of the rights relative to things into two classes; first
jus in re (i.e. which signifies a real right in a thing itself, whereby a person actively
possesses the things as his own); and second jus ad rem which is a right depending
upon the obligation of a person to give a thing, but in which thing itself the creditor
has no real right, but only a right to compel the debtor to fulfil his obligation as far as
possible; as for instance suppose A bought 100 quarters of wheat from B and paid for
them, on the agreement that said wheat was to be delivered within a certain time. But
before the expiry of this time B fails. Upon this A demands the wheat, but does not
obtain it; he merely ranks with the other creditors, and gets his proportional dividend.
But you will say, A paid for his wheat, and therefore it is his property; true, but the
other creditors of B are exactly in the same situation, for B owes them all either wheat
or money or some other commodity; they have all as good a right as A and therefore A
only gets a dividend along with the rest. In this case A has a right ad rem, but not in re.
If he had got the wheat at the time he paid for it, then he would have a right in re; it
would have been his own real and actual property.
In bankruptcy, Bell implies, there is misery all round, and no one creditor should
be favoured over any other.71 And far from being resistant to this result, as
has sometimes been the modern approach,72 Bell sees the principle of paritas
creditorum as a simple and obvious question of fairness.
A final passage from Yule’s notes shows Bell venturing, uncharacteristically,
into matters philosophical. Once again his treatment is both clear and, for a
student audience, illuminating:73
There is also a difference between legal and moral obligation. Let us suppose that
a man has through misfortune become bankrupt, and is lying in jail, and that some
person hearing of his destitute circumstances, sends him a banknote sufficient to
pay his creditors, and procure his release. After a while this person in turn becomes
bankrupt and is thrown into prison. Now is the time for the former bankrupt, whom
we shall suppose in the meantime to have acquired wealth, to step forward and release
his benefactor. But is he bound in Law to do this? By no means; – there is here a strong
70 Yule, Notes (n 56) 2-3.
71 For a modern statement of this fundamental principle, see N R Whitty, “Sharp v Thomson: identifying
the mischief” 1995 SLT (News) 79.
72 Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 67 per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry: “The decision of
the Extra Division is correct. But it shocks.” Bell was less tender-hearted.
73 Yule, Notes (n 56) 3-4.
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moral obligation but no legal one. On the other hand, if at the time the former was
relieved from his difficulties, he granted a written promise to repeat the sum, then of
course there is a legal obligation.
E. STRUCTURE
In devising a structure for his lectures, and hence for his Principles, Bell was
working within a tradition, influential in a number of countries, by which law
was expounded systematically on the pattern of Justinian’s Institutes.74 Stair’s
Institutions and the Institute of Bankton and of Erskine were the most significant
Scottish examples of this “institutional” model.75 But whereas the earlier writers
tended to copy the Justinianic structure closely or, in the case of Erskine, very
closely,76 Bell in his Principles followed a plan which was partly of his own
devising. “The object of Jurisprudence”, Bell states at the very outset, “is the
protection and enforcement of Civil Rights”. Civil rights are divided into those
which relate to property and those which relate to the person; and property
rights are themselves divided into real rights and personal rights.77 The result is a
fourfold division which corresponds to the first four parts78 of the Principles:79
Rights personal; arising from contract express or implied.80
Rights real; of property heritable and moveable.
Rights arising from marriage, and the constitution of a family; with the laws of
succession.
Rights relative to the person.
To these four parts of the book Bell adds a fifth which was originally on actions,
in the traditional way, but which by the fourth edition had become a treatment
74 K Luig, “The institutes of national law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” 1972 JR 193.
For a discussion and further references, see N R Whitty, “The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia and the
institutional tradition”, in S Hetherington (ed), Halsbury’s Laws of England Centenary Essays 2007
(2007) 203 at 204-206.
75 Viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland Deduced from its Originals and Collated with
the Civil, Canon and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations (1681; 2nd and
last personal edn 1693); A McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil
Rights: with Observations upon the Agreement or Diversity between them and the Laws of England
(1751-1753); J Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland (1773).
76 P Birks and G McLeod (eds), Justinian’s Institutes (1987) 19.
77 Prin §§1-3.
78 By the 5th edition (1860), prepared by Patrick Shaw, “parts” had become “books”, and the books were
subdivided into parts and chapters.
79 The list quoted is as given in § 4. However, the wording is slightly different in the table of contents, and
different again in the actual headings to individual parts.
80 This includes obligations more generally. The title of part I is “Obligations and Contracts, and their
Extinction”.
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of evidence, diligence and bankruptcy. No room is found for criminal law, and
indeed Bell seems never to have offered lectures on that topic.81
Alan Watson comments that Bell’s order of treatment is “much altered” from
Justinian and that, with the publication of the Principles, the “Romanisation of
the systematics of Scots law suffered a setback”.82 If criticism is intended, it is not
wholly deserved. Bell’s structure was not notably less orthodox than that of his
successor in the Edinburgh Chair, More, who nonetheless claimed adherence to
the trichotomy of persons, things and actions.83 Averse by nature to justification,
Bell has nothing to say on the subject, but his structure is plainly influenced by
the Justinianic scheme.
More serious is the charge that the Principles is badly organised or, as
Goudy put it, is “unsystematic in arrangement”.84 It is certainly true that topics
sometimes jostle together without apparent order, and that the relationship
between different sections of the text is not always explained. But if, as Walker
suggests, order “does not seem to have been very important to him”,85 Bell usually
provides a sufficient framework for the exceptionally wide range of material which
he seeks to cover. Often indeed he does much better than this, and part I of the
Principles in particular (on contractual and other personal rights) sets out the law
in what is a generally logical and well-organised manner.
Quite properly, decisions as to structure were influenced by the exigencies
of teaching. Thus Bell reverses Erskine (and Justinian) by covering obligations
before property because, while the order “signifies little”, “some conveniences
in explanation seem to recommend an arrangement by which the Rights arising
from Contract or Convention shall first be considered”.86 Again, while Bell
accepts that the exposition of land law in the first section of part II “should
naturally be followed by a view of the doctrine and rules of succession”, he
concludes that “it is better to defer the consideration of those subjects, till
a general idea shall be obtained of the nature of property in moveables”.87
81 On this point Bell’s evidence to the Royal Commission was that: “The Criminal Law is a subject of
lectures perhaps chiefly useful for young men at the Bar, or intended for the Bar; and, from the mass
of matter which was to be disposed of in a course so extensive as mine, I found it altogether unfit ..
to enter on an imperfect explanation of so difficult and delicate a matter as Criminal Law”. See Royal
Commission Evidence (n 25) 188. The result was that no lectures were given at Edinburgh University
on criminal law at this time.
82 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974) 38-39.
83 McLaren (ed), More’s Lectures (n 53) vol 1, 14-15. More, however, restored actions and also included
a section on criminal law.
84 H Goudy, Review of the 9th edn of the Principles (1889) 1 JR 410.
85 Walker, Scottish Jurists (n 12) 345.
86 Prin § 4. This explanation was dropped from the 4th edition.
87 Prin § 307. This passage only appears in the 1st edition.
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Succession is thus left over until part III, and indeed in the lectures themselves
Bell seems to have covered moveable property before heritable.88
F. STYLE
If Bell’s style seems laconic and unvarnished, it must be recalled that, at least as
originally conceived, the Principles was designed to convey basic information to
students, thus freeing up time in lectures for more wide-ranging discussion and
commentary. In reading the Principleswe should remember that the commentary
is missing.
In later editions Bell sometimes added to the end of a paragraph a brief
discursive passage. These are easily found because they are in a smaller font and
are introduced, in the fourth edition at least, by the word “Note”. Quite often
they engage with comparative material. For example, at the end of § 86, which
had explained that property in the sale of goods passes on delivery and not by
contract, Bell writes:89
A distinction is to be observed between the language of the English law and that of
the Scottish in this respect; for much confusion has arisen from this source, in running
the analogy between the laws of the two countries. The English lawyers say, that, the
contract of sale being completed, the property is passed: They do not, however, mean
by this that the absolute property, the proprietary right or dominium, is thenceforward
with the buyer; but only that a special property, jus ad rem specificam, has passed.
There is still with the seller a right to retain the thing sold for the price. The English
law in this respect is law in America; and by the Code Civil of France, the rule
which formerly prevailed there, according to the principle of the civil law, has been
abandoned, and the property held to pass with the completion of the contract. In
Holland the property is not passed till delivery on credit, or payment of the price.
Relatively speaking, however, such notes are unusual and it is possible to read
large numbers of pages, especially later on in the work, without coming across
one.
Today the very conciseness of Bell’s work seems an advantage. By discarding
the detail and laying bare the underlying principles, Bell facilitates the
understanding of complex ideas and promotes the orderly development of the
law. At times, the combination of terse statement and brief numbered paragraphs
reminds the reader of a civil code. Bell indeed cites the French Code civil (1804)
from time to time and was doubtless influenced by what must have seemed a
daringly innovative approach to law and law-making. The point was not lost on
88 That is the position as disclosed in both sets of student notes mentioned in n 56.
89 References omitted. This note is already present in the 2nd edition but is confined to the law of England.
The discussion of other countries is new in the 4th edition.
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those who, in the second half of the nineteenth century, thought that Scotland
too should have a civil code:90
Let us suppose, for example, that the late Professor Bell had been invited to convert
his Principles of the Law of Scotland into a Code. While he could have added nothing
to the clearness and precision of the leading rules which he had laid down, and of the
minor rules and exceptional rules by which they are carried out or modified, he would
have been able to sweep away all matter of mere doubt and conflict, and to adopt
positively those half-established rules which in his opinion were the most correct. He
would also, at the same time, have been able to give a little more breadth to his leading
principles, and more sharpness and distinctness to the details. The result would have
been a manual of the Law of Scotland in which scarcely an ambiguity could be found,
containing all that was necessary to guide men through the ordinary concerns of life;
containing further, all the principles by which the most abstruse questions arising out
of the most complicated transactions could be decided by the lawyer. And yet this
Code would have occupied no more space than that of an octavo volume of extremely
moderate thickness.
This, however, is to over-state the codal nature of Bell’s Principles. AeneasMackay
was closer to the mark when he suggested that the Principles might “hold the
relation to the future Scottish Code, which the writings of Pothier did to the
French Code”.91
G. SOURCES
“If Stair be taken as the type of the philosophical and Erskine of the common-
sense lawyer”, wrote Aeneas Mackay, “Mr Bell may perhaps be styled the lawyer
of precedent”.92 There is something to be said for this view. Certainly no writer
before Bell made such extensive use of case law, and its comforting presence
in his footnotes helps explain why the Principles has the feel of a modern text-
book – indeed of the first modern text-book on Scots law.93 Of course, the idea of
decisions as an authoritative source of law was an older one, dating back at least
to the middle of the previous century:94 “decisions of the Supreme Court, when
pure”, Bell said, “are received as precedents for future cases”.95 But Bell’s career
coincided with a revolution in the availability of reports of cases, both old and
new. Morison’s multi-volume Dictionary of Decisions – the “great Collection of
90 J B Kinnear, Principles of Reform: Political and Legal (1865) 231-232.
91 H Goudy, A J G Mackay and R V Campbell, Addresses on Codification of Law (1893) 51-52.
92 A J G Mackay,Memoir of Sir James Dalrymple, first Viscount Stair (1873) 172-173.
93 Bell’s Commentaries, also rich in case law, is not a text-book in the same sense.
94 J W Cairns, “Historical introduction”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law
in Scotland (2000) vol 1, 14 at 172-175.
95 Lees, Notes (n 56) 3.
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Morrison” as Bell later described it to his students96 – began to appear in 1801,
at the end of Bell’s first decade at the bar, and reproduced reports contained in
many of the existing collections of decisions, published and unpublished. This
was followed by Tait’s “most correct Index of Names” in 1823,97 and by Mungo
Brown’s five-volume supplement to Morison in 1826. Meanwhile in 1807 David
Robertson had published the first collection of decisions of the House of Lords
in Scottish appeals, covering the early years of the Union.98 The reporting of
contemporary cases was also much improved, with the inauguration of the series
that was later to be known as Session Cases in 1821 and of Faculty Decisions
in 1825. The former was the work of Bell’s brother-in-law, Patrick Shaw. So
successful was the reporting of cases that, as Bell later noted, “complaints have
been made of the unwieldy mass thus accumulated”.99
In all Bell cites around 6000 cases in the Principles. In an astonishing display
of drudgery and determination, each was reduced to a convenient summary in
the three volumes of his Illustrations from Adjudged Cases of the Principles of
the Law of Scotland (1836-9). Although most were from the Scottish courts,
a significant number of cases were English, and Bell went to the trouble
of including a brief guide to English procedure in the first volume of the
Illustrations.100 “English Cases”, Bell informed his students, “are of authority in
Mercantile Law, and frequently of the greatest use in illustration, or in contrast,
on other parts of jurisprudence”.101 In the Principles, English cases are usually
listed separately, after the Scottish, and in the third edition – though rarely in
the fourth102 – are sometimes preceded by the words of warning, “English cases”.
As well as cases, Bell also cites statutes where appropriate, covering topics such
as authentication of deeds, illegal contracts, carriage, insurance, shipping law,
copyright, and prescription.103
The jurists most frequently relied on by Bell are Stair104 and, especially,
Erskine.105 Erskine’s Principles, Bell explains to his students, “is excellent,
although it appears dry to a person commencing his studies”.106 The Institute
96 Bell, Outline (n 22) iv. The spelling is Bell’s.
97 Bell, Outline (n 22) iv.
98 Appeals for the years 1726-1821 were not reported until after Bell’s death. Thomas Paton’s reports were
published between 1849 and 1856.
99 G J Bell, Illustrations from Adjudged Cases of the Principles of the Law of Scotland vol I (1836) v.
100 Illustrations vol I, xxi-xxiv.
101 Bell, Outline (n 22) v. This is repeated in the first 3 editions but, for some reason, is dropped from the
4th. See 1st edn xxvi; 2nd edn xxvi; 3rd edn xviii.
102 But see § 34.
103 The text of the statutes is given in Bell, Illustrations (n 99) vol I, 485-508.
104 Stair, Institutions (n 75).
105 Erskine, Principles (n 1); Erskine, Institute (n 75).
106 Lees, Notes (n 56) 5.
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“is posthumous, and was therefore received at first with some degree of suspicion”
but “is now firmly established as an authority”.107 It is “the most useful book which
a Student can possess”.108 In all, the works of Erskine – usually the Institute – are
cited on more than 400 occasions, while Stair is cited on more than 200. Craig’s
Jus Feudale109 is used frequently in the treatment of land law. Bankton,110 on the
other hand, is barely mentioned: his work, apparently, “is not well digested, and is
seldom consulted”.111 For English law, Bell relies mainly on Blackstone112 or on
specialist works such as Charles Abbot’s Treatise of the Law relative to Merchant
Ships and Seamen (1802 and subsequent editions).
Roman sources and the writers of the ius commune are largely absent, although
there is occasional citation of Justinian’s Institutes andDigest and of ius commune
jurists such as Voet.113 For this neglect a plausible explanation is that Bell left
school at the age of eleven without acquiring a proper mastery of Latin.114
Another reason may have been that, after Pothier and the Code civil, there could
be no going back to the “doctors” of an earlier period.115
The works of Pothier (1699-1772) had been known in the British Isles
since at least the publication of Sir William Jones’ An Essay on the Law of
Bailments in 1781 – a work cited on a number of occasions by Bell116 – with
its graceful acknowledgement that “if my undissembled fondness for the study
of Jurisprudence were never to produce any greater benefit to the publick, than
barely the introduction of POTHIER to the acquaintance of my countrymen, I
should think that I had in some measure discharged the debt which every man,
107 Lees, Notes (n 56) 5. But see Kibble v Stevenson (1831) 5 W & S 553 at 565 per Lord Brougham LC:
“I have the greatest deference for his works, particularly his first work [i.e. Erskine’s Principles], which
had his own revision when it passed through the press”.
108 Bell, Outline (n 22) iii.
109 T Craig, Jus Feudale (1655).
110 Bankton, Institute (n 75).
111 Lees, Notes (n 56) 5. The verdict of More, Bell’s successor in the Chair, is more flattering: “though it
has never stood so high in public estimation” as the works of Stair and Erskine, it “is a publication of
considerable merit”: see McLaren (ed),More’s Lectures (n 53) vol I, 13.
112 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769).
113 J Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (1698-1704).
114 The Letters of Sir Charles Bell (n 9) 8-9 refers to and quotes from some “memoranda of my life, to tell
my children somewhat of those who gave them birth, and to furnish them with lessons for the conduct
of their lives” – now apparently lost – in which George Joseph Bell records that, after leaving school:
“I tried to continue with my Latin education at home, but having no master and no one to direct me
– to point the path or smooth its ruggedness – I made poor progress”.
115 The citation pattern in the Commentaries, in its origins a much earlier work, is to some extent
different: see G Gorla, “Bell, one of the founding fathers of the ‘common and comparative law of
Europe’ during the nineteenth century” 1982 JR 121. Gorla’s view that, in his use of foreign materials,
Bell was working in the same tradition as the ius commune writers of the 16-18th centuries is more
true of the Commentaries than of the Principles.
116 Eg §§ 133, 154, 155, 215 of the 4th edition.
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according to Lord Coke, owes to his profession”.117 By the time that Bell wrote
the Principles he had been familiar with Pothier for at least 30 years.118 Indeed
he claimed to have been the first person to import Pothier’s works to Scotland.119
J S More, Bell’s successor in the Chair of Scots Law, was later to tell his students
that:120
Without meaning to disparage in the slightest degree the ponderous and valuable
labours of CUJACIUS, MOLINAEUS, and VOET, and other eminent commentators
on the Civil Law, I may be permitted to give it as my opinion that POTHIER has done
more substantial service to this system, by his judicious arrangement of the Pandects,
and by the few short notes he has occasionally given, than all the other commentators
put together.
But while Bell made use of Pothier’s Pandectae Justinianae, his main interest lay
in the treatises on individual branches of the law. In the Principles, references can
be found to Pothier’s writings on property, sale, hire, partnership, deposit, charter
party, condictio indebiti, among others, but above all Bell relies on the Traité des
obligations, which is cited frequently in the opening part of the work.121
The early editions of the Principlesmake relatively little use of works published
after 1800, although there are exceptions such as C-B-M Toullier’s Le Droit civil
français suivant l’ordre du Code Napoléon (1811-31). Bell seems not to have not
read German and so – unlike his contemporary, John Austin, in his lectures at
London University122 – was not in a position to draw on Hugo or Savigny or
other writers of the German Historical School.123 Many of the works cited in
the Principles can already be found in the first edition of the Commentaries thirty
years before. If, however, there was a sense that Bell was sometimes failing to
keep up with new developments abroad, the position was transformed by the
publication, between 1826 and 1830, of James Kent’s four-volume Commentaries
on American Law, with its comprehensive account of American law and its rich
citation, and discussion, of foreign sources, including Bell’s ownCommentaries.124
117 W Jones, An Essay on the Law of Bailments (1781) 29-30.
118 There are many references to Pothier’s works in the Commentaries. Bell was taught French by his
mother: see Letters of Sir Charles Bell (n 9) 9.
119 As reported by Charles Sumner to Joseph Story in a letter from Stirling dated 7 Oct 1838 and
reproduced in K H Nadelmann, “Joseph Story and George Joseph Bell” 1959 JR 31 at 37.
120 McLaren (ed),More’s Lectures (n 53) vol I, 4.
121 The last citation appears to be in § 251 in the context of cautionary obligations.
122 See e.g. M H Hoeflich, “John Austin and Joseph Story: two nineteenth century perspectives on the
utility of the civil law for the common lawyer” (1985) 29 Am J of Legal History 36 at 38-41.
123 These writers were already known in Scotland in the 1820s: see J W Cairns, “The influence of
the German Historical School in early nineteenth century Edinburgh” (1994) 20 Syracuse J of
International Law and Commerce 191.
124 Bell’s Commentaries is cited by Kent on a number of occasions, and is referred to at one point (vol 3,
294) as “very valuable”.
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Like Bell’s Principles, Kent’s Commentaries was the product of a university
lecture course, in Kent’s case at Columbia.125 Also important were two works
by Joseph Story: Commentaries on the Law of Bailments with illustrations from
the Civil and the Foreign Law (1832) and Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,
Foreign and Domestic (1834).126 Both works cite Bell’s Commentaries and the
former does so on many occasions. Bell probably came across this American
literature between the third edition of the Principles in 1833 and the fourth in
1839, and it seems to have reawakened his interest in comparative law.127 In the
fourth edition there are frequent references to Kent and Story, especially the
former, and Bell also draws on works cited by Kent and Story, such as the Cours
de droit commercial of Jean-Marie Pardessus (1813).128
What use Bell made of all this material is more difficult to say. His knowledge
of Pothier was so long-standing that it seems bound to have influenced his view
of Scots law at least in the field of contract, where some claim could be made for
a common law of Europe. That is a subject which would repay further study.129
But in his citation of Kent or Story or Pardessus, Bell was more often engaging
in comparative law – pointing out similarities and differences, and adding to the
store of knowledge in Scotland without any particular intention of influencing
law’s future development.130 Thus in the same way that Kent, for example, noted
in his Commentaries under reference to Bell that “In Scotland, the true owner
may reclaim his property, even from the bona fide purchaser in market overt”,131
125 See J H Langbein, “Chancellor Kent and the history of legal literature” (1993) 93 Columbia L Rev
546 at 564-566. Kent lectured at Columbia between 1824 and 1826 after his retirement as Chancellor
of New York.
126 See more generally Nadelmann (n 119).
127 Sumner’s letter to Story (n 119) says that Bell “was well acquainted with Kent’s Commentaries, and
inquired after the Chancellor as if for an old friend”.
128 Pardessus’ work was previously known to Bell and is cited occasionally in the 5th edition of the
Commentaries.
129 Bell’s treatment of error (Prin § 11) is thought to be based on Pothier: see J J Gow, “Culpa in docendo”
(1954) 66 JR 253 at 261-262; P Stein, Fault in the Formation of Contract in Roman Law and Scots
Law (1958) 183. McBryde doubts this conclusion on the basis that the reference to Pothier in § 11
does not appear until the 4th edition: see W W McBryde, “Error”, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds),
History of Private Law in Scotland (n 94) vol 2, 72 at 76-77. On the other hand, there are many
references to Pothier in earlier editions of the Principles and it may be wrong to place weight on
precise citation patterns. In relation to Bell’s discussion of a different topic – damages for breach of
contract in Commentaries I, 479-480 – Johnston concludes that “his primary inspiration was Pothier”:
see D Johnston, “Breach of contract”, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds), History of Private Law in
Scotland vol 2, 175 at 191.
130 For the view that Kent’s citation of foreign law was, likewise, usually decorative, see A Watson,
“Chancellor Kent’s use of foreign law”, in M Reimann (ed), The Reception of Continental Ideas in
the Common Law World 1820-1920 (1993) 45.
131 J Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 4th edn (1840) vol 2, 324 note a. The reference to Bell was
to § 527 of the Principles.
Vol 15 2011 from text-book to book of authority 27
so Bell noted in his Principles under reference to Kent that “In America the
rule of damage on returned foreign bills is different, and varies in the several
States”.132 Brief comments such as these are the only published indication of how
Bell thought this material could best be used, but such points are likely to have
been more fully developed in his lectures. If that is correct, it may not have been
popular with students. Law teachers are unhappily accustomed to complaints of
the kind made by a member of Bell’s class for 1824-25:133
Professor Bell seems rather to be the Professor of French and English law than of Scots
.. not that I find any fault with him for explaining to us the principles of the English or
of the French law, or for quoting them at times; but surely it is chiefly incumbent upon
him to expound to us the principles of Scots law, and to quote authorities from Scots
cases rather than from those of other countries.
When More said in his introductory lecture that he did not “mean to convert this
Chair into a medium for disseminating the knowledge of Foreign Law”, he was
no doubt responding to the unfortunate reputation in this regard which had been
acquired by his predecessor.134
It would be wrong, of course, to present the Principles as a work dominated
by comparative law. Thick on the ground in the treatment of contract law or
of certain commercial topics, comparative references are uncertainly distributed
in other parts of the book. In the more than 200 pages devoted to land law –
a subject “more liable to peculiarities in national jurisprudence”135 – they are
largely absent even where they might have been useful or illuminating. Thus it
was left to another book published in 1839, Gale and Whatley’s account of the
Law of Easements,136 to draw on Pardessus’ Traité des servitudes, first published
in 1806, and so to introduce into English law certain aspects of the French law
of servitudes.137 And it was Kent138 and, much later, Rankine,139 who made use
of Fournel’s Traité du Voisinage (1800); Bell’s own, quite extensive, account of
132 Prin § 342. The reference to Kent was to vol 3 of the Commentaries, 2nd edn (1832) 116.
133 The New Lapsus Linguae or The College Tatler 11 Feb 1825, quoted in Bates (n 64) 176-77. For
the very brief history of this publication, see R L Stevenson, “College Papers”, in Lay Morals (1911)
83-84.
134 McLaren (ed),More’s Lectures (n 53) vol I, 5-6.
135 Bell, Prin § 636.
136 C J Gale and T D Whatley, A Treatise on the Law of Easements (1839).
137 See A W B Simpson, “The rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and the Code civil” (1967) 83 LQR 240;
C Seebo, Servitus und Easement: Die Rezeption des römischen Servitutenrechts in England (2005)
103 ff; K G C Reid, “Praedial servitudes”, in V V Palmer and E C Reid (eds), Mixed Jurisdictions
Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and Scotland (Edinburgh Studies in Law vol 6, 2009) 1 at 25-28.
138 J Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 3rd edn (1836) vol 3, 435. The reference is absent from
earlier editions, including the edition (the 2nd) which seems to have been used by Bell.
139 J Rankine, The Law of Landownership in Scotland, 4th edn (1909) 632, 633, 636 and 653. The
references first appear in the 2nd edition of 1884.
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neighbour law is untroubled by comparative references.140 Yet patchy as the
pattern is, there are probably more citations of foreign texts in the Principles
than in any work on Scots law published before or, it may be, since.
H. INFLUENCE AND REPUTATION
From as early as 1832 – two years after the second edition and one before the
third – the Principles was being cited to, and sometimes by, the courts.141 But
it was not yet viewed as an authoritative text or perhaps even as a reliable one.
In Herriot’s Trs v Stevens’ Trs,142 for example, a case concerning the recall of
arrestments and inhibitions, Lord Chancellor Cottenham quoted the Principles
at some length but with the rider, “assuming this to be a correct representation
in the law of Scotland”. And in Dixon v Dixon143 Lord Meadowbank, referring to
a passage by Bell on the renunciation of legitim which was in conflict with both
Stair and Erskine, said that “with the greatest respect for him – a living author,
too144 – we cannot compare the weight of authority”.145 By the second half of the
century, however, Bell was being cited with increasing frequency and respect.146
Looking back in 1889, Goudy wrote of the Principles:147
For nearly half a century it has been recognised as a standard work, cited daily in the
Courts, and accepted by the judges as possessing the highest authority. There never
was a greater municipal lawyer than George Joseph Bell.
140 §§ 964-972 of the 4th edition. I owe this point to Elspeth Reid.
141 Magistrates of Montrose v Scott (1832) 10 S 211 at 212 per the Lord Ordinary (Corehouse) (“the note
in Connel on Parishes, p. 370, relative to that case, as a late writer observes, (Bell’s Principles of the
Law of Scotland, p. 302) is not to be relied upon”); Duke of Portland v Gray (1832) 11 S 14 at 18
(defenders’ authorities).
142 (1839) Macl & Rob 192 at 214.
143 (1840) 2 D 1121 at 1160.
144 See also Kibble v Stevenson (1831) 5 W & S 553 at 565 per Lord Brougham LC: “I do not cite him
[Bell] as any authority for a living author cannot be cited in a court of justice”.
145 In McRobert v Martin (1840) 2 D 752, Lord Justice-Clerk Boyle and Lords Glenlee, Meadowbank,
Medwyn and Moncreiff said (at 771): “A passage in Mr Bell’s Principles [§ 1627], which is quoted
by the pursuer, has, with the usual care and accuracy of that author, been materially qualified in the
fourth edition, lately published, where he states the present question as entirely open”.
146 One example among many is the prominent part played by Bell’s discussion of rei interventus in the
speech of Lord Chancellor Chelmsford in Bargaddie Coal Co v Wark (1859) 3 Macq 467. In Swans
v Western Bank (1866) 4 M 663, where the First Division discussed (and declined to follow) a doubt
expressed in § 882 of the Principles as to whether there could be accretion of infeftments where the
granter had no title at all, Lord Deas said (at 669) that: “No doubt could be entitled to more respect
than a doubt expressed by the late Professor Bell”.
147 Goudy (n 84). See also the anonymous review which appeared in (1872) 1 LawMagazine and Review:
A Quarterly Review of Jurisprudence 165 at 167: “The work has been found so extremely useful by
the legal profession in Scotland, that we never heard of any person at all connected with the law who
ventured to live without it”.
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Bell’s influence was not confined to Scotland.148 Courts in America – but
not, on the whole, in England – were perfectly willing to cite Bell during this
period,149 no doubt largely because of the advocacy of writers such as Kent and
Story, already referred to.150 Indeed volume 3 of the fourth edition of Kent’s
Commentaries, published in 1840, contains a gushing testimonial:151
There is an admirable summary of the law of contracts, express and implied, treated
of in this and the preceding volume, to be seen in the Principles of the Law of
Scotland, by Professor Bell, of the University of Edinburgh, 3d edition, 1833. The
essential principles of the law of contracts, of sale, hiring, bailment, surety, negotiable
paper, partnership, maritime contracts of affreightment, average, salvage, bottomry
and respondentia, marine insurance, and insurance against fire and of lives, are stated
with all possible brevity consistent with perspicuity, precision, and accuracy. The cases
and authorities are annexed to each proposition, and the adjudged cases are given at
large in some succeeding volumes as illustrations of the principles declared. I do not
know of a more convenient and useful manual of the kind to the student and practising
lawyer. Though the principles of Scotch law are drawn from the civil law, yet they agree
in most of the material points, with the doctrines and adjudications in the English and
American law.
Even into the twentieth century someone wanting to find out about Scots law, in
America or elsewhere, was quite likely to have recourse to Bell’s Principles.152
At least at first, the popularity of the Principles depended on the fact that it
was kept up-to-date in the frequent new editions published after Bell’s death.
No mere historical text, it was a statement of the current law and could be used
by lawyers to guide their daily practice. New editions were produced at regular
intervals from 1860 until 1899, the year of the tenth and last edition. The editor
for all editions other than the fifth, of 1860, was William Guthrie. Although
originally written as a student text, the Principles seems to have lost the battle
148 In Boak v Megget (1844) 6 D 662, decided within months of Bell’s death, LordMoncreiff commented,
at 675, that: “The law of this country, and of Europe in general, is much and deeply indebted to
Mr Bell, and I know that the value of his works have been appreciated not only here, but in other
countries; but at the same time I hold that he is not quite correct in this instance.”
149 R H Helmholz, “Scots law in the New World: its place in the formative era of American law”, in H L
MacQueen (ed),Miscellany Five (Stair Society vol 52, 2006) 169 at 175-176.
150 See G above.
151 J Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 4th edn (1840) vol 3, 376. It is interesting to note that this
passage survived in the final, “thoroughly revised” editions of Kent published at the end of the century
– for example, it can be found at vol 3, 406 of the 1889 edition – although the fact that the reference
was still to Bell’s 1833 edition suggests either lip service or editorial inertia.
152 See e.g. R Pound, “Individual interests in the domestic relations” (1916) 14 Michigan L Rev 177
at 185. In a review (n 147) the anonymous reviewer comments (at 167): “To a stranger wishing to
acquire a knowledge of Scots law the work is invaluable . . . [H]ad we such a book on English law as
this, many of us would be as learned in the law of England as a Chief Justice.” For the tradition of
overview literature on Scots law, see e.g. P Birks, “The foundation of legal rationality in Scotland”, in
R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (1995) 81.
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for the student market to Erskine’s Principles,153 which had the advantage of
covering criminal law as well as civil. In truth, the later editions of Bell’s Principles
had become too long for a student text-book, and in 1903 Frank H Morrison
produced a Synopsis of Bell’s Principles of the Law of Scotland written specially
for students.154 But by then, presumably, it was too late to dislodge the preference
for Erskine.
The abandonment of fresh editions in the twentieth century was a sign, not that
Bell’s Principles had ceased to be useful, but rather that it had become useful
in a different way. During his lifetime Bell was already being referred to as an
“institutional writer” or the author of an “institutional work”155 but, in the usage
of the day, this signified little more than that he was the author of a text on the
municipal law of a comprehensive and systematic nature.156 By the end of the
century the meaning had changed, and an institutional work had become, not
merely a work of a particular type, but one imbued with a degree of authority not
afforded to other works, including, sometimes, other works by the same author.157
Bell’s Principles was incontestably among the canon of institutional works. A
review of the sixth edition, in 1872, began with the following passage:158
Three Scotch lawyers have risen to real greatness as writers on the law of their country.
These we style institutional writers, and their opinions, when they agree, which for the
most part they do, are received by our courts as conclusive.
The writers in question were Stair, Erskine and Bell. One result of this change of
status was a growing tendency to distinguish between those parts of the Principles
153 The last edition of Erskine’s Principles (the 21st) was published in 1911. In the preface to the first
edition of W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland in 1927, it is noted
that Erskine’s Principles “has held a leading place as a text-book in the classes of Scots Law in the
Universities”.
154 A brief review published at (1903) 15 JR 437 said that it “appears to be admirably adapted to serve
the purposes of refreshing the memory of candidates on the eve of examination”.
155 See e.g. Dixon v Dixon (1840) 2 D 1121 at 1135 per Lord Moncreiff (“the only institutional work
in Scotland where such a doctrine is laid down”); H Cockburn, Memorials of His Time (1856) 206
(“our greatest modern institutional writer”). The extract of 1822 from the Caledonian Mercury at 7
above refers to Bell’s “eminent services as an institutional writer”. See also J W G Blackie, “Stair’s later
reputation as a jurist”, in DMWalker (ed), Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair Society vol 33, 1981) 207
at 210-211.
156 J W Cairns, “Institutional writings in Scotland reconsidered” (1983) 4 J Leg Hist 76 at 76-81. Even
so, it seems that institutional writers already had some kind of status. In the notes on Bell’s lectures
taken by Thomas Lees in 1825-26, institutional writers are listed as a fifth and final source of law (after
statutes, court decisions, acts of sederunt, and deeds and forms). The relevant passage reads (Lees,
Notes (n 56) 4): “The Books of our Institutional Writers are also considered evidence of Law. These
afford proof of the Common Law, as sanctioned by the Judges.”
157 Cairns (n 156) at 102-104.
158 Review (n 147).
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which had been written by Bell and those parts which had been added by later
editors, for only the former were “institutional”.159
As an institutional work (in the modern sense), the Principles has continued
to be influential. Although more consulted in the nineteenth century than in the
twentieth,160 as one would expect, the Principles has been cited more than 700
times in reported cases since 1900 and there is no sign of a falling off in its use.161
The range of topics for which it is used reflects the extraordinary range of the work
itself: leases,162 servitudes,163 accession,164 parts and pertinents,165 succession,166
husband and wife,167 nuisance,168 liability of joint wrongdoers,169 novation,170
retention,171 prescription,172 assignation,173 partnership,174 evidence,175 and so
on. Lord Cooper described Bell as “our chief authority on the law of contract”,176
and indeed in 1847 Patrick Shaw had published A Treatise on the Law of
Obligations and Contracts – the first on the topic in Scotland – compiled entirely
from Bell’s writings. Other areas to which the Principles has made a notable
contribution include personal bar,177 warrandice,178 and common property,179
159 See e.g.Grant v Heriot’s Trust (1906) 8 F 647 at 655 per the Lord President (Dunedin); Trades House
of Glasgow v Ferguson 1979 SLT 187 at 188-189 per Sheriff I Macphail.
160 A search in the Justis database of Session Cases reveals the 1870s as the peak, with a gradual falling
off thereafter. The search term used was “Bell near Principles”.
161 The figure is obtained from searches in Westlaw.
162 E.g. DFR Properties Ltd v Glen House Properties 2007 SC 74.
163 E.g. Romano v Standard Commercial Property Securities Ltd [2008] CSOH 105, 2008 SLT 859.
164 E.g. Boskabelle Ltd v Laird [2006] CSOH 173, 2006 SLT 1079.
165 E.g. Compugraphics International Ltd v Nikolic [2009] CSOH 54.
166 E.g. De Lathouwery [2007] CSOH 54, 2007 SLT 437.
167 E.g. S H v K H 2006 SC 129.
168 E.g. Robb v Dundee City Council 2002 SC 301.
169 E.g.Wright v Stoddard International plc [2007] CSOH 138.
170 E.g.M R S Distribution Ltd v D S Smith (UK) Ltd 2004 SLT 631.
171 E.g. Charles Brand Ltd v Orkney Islands Council 2001 SC 545.
172 E.g.Mason’s Exrs v Smith 2002 SLT 1169.
173 E.g. Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123.
174 E.g. Thurso Building Society’s JF v Robertson 2000 SC 547.
175 E.g. HM Advocate v Duffy [2009] HCJAC 5, 2009 SLT 47.
176 Lord Cooper, The Scottish Legal Tradition (new enlarged edn by M C Meston and W D H Sellar,
1991) 80 (=Lord Cooper, Selected Papers (1957) 190). Bell’s contribution has sometimes been
controversial, especially in the area of error: see WWMcBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd
edn (2007) paras 15-04 ff, but compare J MacLeod, “Before Bell: the roots of error in the Scots law of
contract” (2010) 14 EdinLR 385, arguing (at 417) that Bell’s account is no more than “a work of minor
synthesis, bringing together strands already present in the Scottish discourse”.
177 See e.g. William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901; E C Reid
and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006) paras 1-16 ff.
178 See e.g. Clark v Lindale Homes Ltd 1994 SC 210, a case which, unusually, picks up Bell’s references
to Pothier.
179 See e.g. Rafique v Amin 1997 SLT 1385; K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) paras
23-33.
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where the rules taken for granted today were more or less invented by Bell.180
The Principles is also cited occasionally in the English courts, most recently in
2009 in the context of shipping law.181 Of particular value is the definition of legal
concepts: Bell, as Lord Dunedin acknowledged, is “a very much greater framer of
definitions than any of us can hope to be”.182 Definitions from the Principles have
launched a thousand legal arguments, and have often been praised as “classic”183
or “the best and most useful”184 or impossible to be “better stated”.185
Today the value of the Principles is seen to lie in its authoritative status, in
its comprehensiveness, and, perhaps above all, in its economy of thought and
expression. Brief but not bland, the Principles reduces complex ideas to their
bare essentials. Rules are stated succinctly and often eloquently.186 Obscurities
are generally avoided.187 A work which began as a student text – as a teaching
prop for the professor – has now a second and enduring life as an “institutional”
statement of the law of Scotland.
180 Prin §§ 1072-1085.
181 Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK plc [2009] EWHC 540 (Comm), [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1.
182 Edinburgh & District Tramways Co Ltd v Courtenay 1909 SC 99 at 104. Lord Dunedin then
proceeded to criticise the definition in question, of recompense, as being too general: “I think if one
could have got Mr Bell back again to ask him, that he would not have been very pleased with his own
definition”.
183 Rutterford Ltd v Allied Breweries Ltd 1990 SLT 249 at 251 per Lord Caplan; Royal Bank of Scotland
plc v Watt 1991 SC 48 at 54 per Lord Justice Clerk Ross.
184 Robb v Dundee City Council 2001 Hous LR 42 at para 62 per Sheriff-Principal J F Wheatley QC.
185 Cowan v Lord Kinnaird (1865) 4 M 236 at 243 per Lord Cowan.
186 Farmers’ Mart Ltd v Milne 1914 SC (HL) 84 at 85-86 per Lord Dunedin; Caledonia North Sea Ltd v
London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123 at 1144 per Lord President Rodger.
187 Of course, what is usefully general to one reader may seem “abundantly vague” to another: for the
latter thought, see Paterson v Paterson (1850) 7 Bell App 337 at 368 per Lord Brougham.
